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With Libya set to join Tunisia and Egypt on the checklist of Arab revolutions, just two countries in North Africa remain relatively untouched. They are Algeria and Morocco. But can they long remain exceptions to the new rule of scorned youth trumping rigid old regimes? In both nations, demonstrations and even violent protests have taken place and will continue. But in neither of the two Maghreb rivals was the lie writ so large as in Tunisia, Libya or Egypt.
During the reign of King Mohammad VI, Morocco has seen democratic progress of sorts. That gathering of protestors in the country’s cities recently to call for reforms did not feel like a watershed moment. Yet it may yet be an important one. If the king reaches out, he can still count on a groundswell of popular support. But this may be an irreversible step toward removing the contradictions in his role as hereditary guardian of the country’s democratic progress.
For its part, Algeria is by no means a one-man state. Instead, it plays host to a swirl of rivalries and intrigue between noisy politicians and the powerful deep state of the military kingmakers.
Indeed, while the Tunisian revolt was in its infancy, Algerians were also out on the streets protesting high prices and the absence of opportunities. The security forces, trained in the rigors of street violence, not least in the volatile Kabylie region, avoided causing death among the demonstrators. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika inched toward common ground by announcing a partial relaxation of emergency laws and, last week, a regulated mortgage scheme to go with an existing pledge to build 1 million affordable homes.
So far Algeria’s massive ranks of battle-hardened security personnel have the upper hand in the ongoing battle. There is a national protest platform, using the power of the web to assemble, but it has been weakened by rivalries between Algeria’s myriad political parties (21 in Parliament alone). Where the Egyptian campaigns, starting with the Kifaya movement, were inclusive due to the dearth in power-greedy opposition groupings, Algerians are hearing more sniping from the sidelines than courageous cries from the core of the protest.
Nor is the Algerian military held in the high esteem it enjoys in Tunisia and Egypt. It has been blemished by civil war atrocities and its leaders are seen as keepers of the secret keys to influence and riches. Were a full-fledged revolt to develop, the military might pass its judgment on the political class, but it is hard to imagine it being perceived as a savior. Meanwhile, the politicians get to move first and thanks to Algeria’s wealth and concomitant independence on the international scene, they have plenty of placating cards yet to play.*
Neighboring Morocco is in a tighter squeeze. The country is poorer and unable to shield its economy from oil shocks and a constant potential for poor harvests. February 20 was Morocco’s “Day of Dignity,” but it ended in violence and ignominy as five people died engulfed by flames in a ransacked bank. And yet the day had begun as a protest against a rigid political system that had turned violent in some of the country’s most deprived urban areas. The contrast could not have been starker between orderly demonstrations in many cities, including the capital, where marchers raised banners and chanted slogans in favor of greater democracy without causing incident, and the rampaging mobs in the streets of many northern towns.
The king cannot duck the biggest decision of his 12-year reign. The two faces of protest suggest two diverging paths open to the monarch. He can listen to the articulate demands for constitutional reform, reducing his own powers and conferring greater sovereignty on parliament. The downside would be losing grip on the financial tiller, as policy and the requirements of the king’s burgeoning personal fortune have intermingled. It wouldn’t have to be humiliating as King Mohammad could use Morocco’s established parties to set out reasonable but limited demands for new rules to the game. The question is whether this would go far enough to engage Moroccans, half of whom do not even participate in the electoral process.*
The alternative for the king is to try to consolidate royal power by setting himself up as the savior of the nation’s poor, castigating current officials, as Jordan’s King Abdullah II has done, with new appointments made to oversee a better administration of kingly largesse. But with a constrained state budget, half of which is bound up in administrative and military costs, partly due to the Western Sahara impasse, this path hardly offers a guarantee of success.
James Badcock is editor of the English edition of the Spanish daily El Pais.
During the reign of King Mohammad VI, Morocco has seen democratic progress of sorts. That gathering of protestors in the country’s cities recently to call for reforms did not feel like a watershed moment. Yet it may yet be an important one. If the king reaches out, he can still count on a groundswell of popular support. But this may be an irreversible step toward removing the contradictions in his role as hereditary guardian of the country’s democratic progress.
For its part, Algeria is by no means a one-man state. Instead, it plays host to a swirl of rivalries and intrigue between noisy politicians and the powerful deep state of the military kingmakers.
Indeed, while the Tunisian revolt was in its infancy, Algerians were also out on the streets protesting high prices and the absence of opportunities. The security forces, trained in the rigors of street violence, not least in the volatile Kabylie region, avoided causing death among the demonstrators. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika inched toward common ground by announcing a partial relaxation of emergency laws and, last week, a regulated mortgage scheme to go with an existing pledge to build 1 million affordable homes.
So far Algeria’s massive ranks of battle-hardened security personnel have the upper hand in the ongoing battle. There is a national protest platform, using the power of the web to assemble, but it has been weakened by rivalries between Algeria’s myriad political parties (21 in Parliament alone). Where the Egyptian campaigns, starting with the Kifaya movement, were inclusive due to the dearth in power-greedy opposition groupings, Algerians are hearing more sniping from the sidelines than courageous cries from the core of the protest.
Nor is the Algerian military held in the high esteem it enjoys in Tunisia and Egypt. It has been blemished by civil war atrocities and its leaders are seen as keepers of the secret keys to influence and riches. Were a full-fledged revolt to develop, the military might pass its judgment on the political class, but it is hard to imagine it being perceived as a savior. Meanwhile, the politicians get to move first and thanks to Algeria’s wealth and concomitant independence on the international scene, they have plenty of placating cards yet to play.*
Neighboring Morocco is in a tighter squeeze. The country is poorer and unable to shield its economy from oil shocks and a constant potential for poor harvests. February 20 was Morocco’s “Day of Dignity,” but it ended in violence and ignominy as five people died engulfed by flames in a ransacked bank. And yet the day had begun as a protest against a rigid political system that had turned violent in some of the country’s most deprived urban areas. The contrast could not have been starker between orderly demonstrations in many cities, including the capital, where marchers raised banners and chanted slogans in favor of greater democracy without causing incident, and the rampaging mobs in the streets of many northern towns.
The king cannot duck the biggest decision of his 12-year reign. The two faces of protest suggest two diverging paths open to the monarch. He can listen to the articulate demands for constitutional reform, reducing his own powers and conferring greater sovereignty on parliament. The downside would be losing grip on the financial tiller, as policy and the requirements of the king’s burgeoning personal fortune have intermingled. It wouldn’t have to be humiliating as King Mohammad could use Morocco’s established parties to set out reasonable but limited demands for new rules to the game. The question is whether this would go far enough to engage Moroccans, half of whom do not even participate in the electoral process.*
The alternative for the king is to try to consolidate royal power by setting himself up as the savior of the nation’s poor, castigating current officials, as Jordan’s King Abdullah II has done, with new appointments made to oversee a better administration of kingly largesse. But with a constrained state budget, half of which is bound up in administrative and military costs, partly due to the Western Sahara impasse, this path hardly offers a guarantee of success.
James Badcock is editor of the English edition of the Spanish daily El Pais.