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La National Oil Corporation (NOC) est la compagnie pétrolière nationale de la Libye. La NOC, avec ses filiales verticalement intégrée, est l'acteur principal de l'industrie pétrolière libyenne, qui contribue à la moitié du PNB libyen. La Libye est membre de l'OPEP et détient les plus grandes réserves pétrolières d'Afrique (suivie par le Nigéria et l'Algérie). Ces réserves sont localisées dans la province du golfe de Syrte qui détient 80% des ressources, et représente actuellement 90% des exportations pétrolières libyennes.
Le 30 Janvier 2005, la Libye a tenu sa première ronde de pétrole et de gaz naturel des concessions d'exploration depuis la fin des sanctions des Etats-Unis: 15 zones ont été offertes pour les enchères. En Octobre 2005, un second tour d'enchères a eu lieu sous EPSA IV, avec 51 entreprises participantes et près de 500 millions de dollars de nouveaux investissements affluent dans le pays comme un résultat. En Décembre 2006, la Libye a tenu sa troisième tour d'enchères; cependant, les PSAs signés par NOC en avril 2007 étaient toujours en cours. Les gagnants de la zone d'exploration libyens sont déterminés en fonction de la hauteur de la part de la production qu’une compagnie est prête à offrir à la NOC. La compagnie qui offrira à la NOC la plus grande part des profits sera susceptible de gagner. En outre, les développeurs du champ pétrolifère devront d'abord supporter tous seuls 100% des coûts (d'exploration, d'évaluation et de formation) pour un minimum de 5 ans, tandis que la NOC conserve sa propriété exclusive. Sont également inclus dans les séries d'octroi libyennes qui ont été effectué dans la concurrence et la transparence , le développement et la commercialisation conjointe des découverte de gaz naturel non-associés, des termes normalisés pour l'exploration et la production (E & P), et de tous les bonus qui sont non récupérables.
En 2007, il a été estimé que seulement environ 30% de la Libye a été explorée pour les hydrocarbures.
L’EPSA IV très exactement c’est quoi ?
North African Oil and Foreign Investment in Changing Market Conditions – July 2008 (OXFORD Institute for Energy Study)
In 2004, substantial new acreage was offered under the terms of EPSA IV. The high interest shown by foreign oil companies during these the last three licensing rounds may suggest that Libya has been offering attractive fiscal terms (see Appendix 1). But quite the contrary, the Libyan terms have been described as the toughest in the world. In what follows, we describe the EPSA signed between the Libyan NOC and Verenex Energy and its partner MEDCO for area 47 granted under the first licensing round. EPSA IV follows the conventional PSA structure but there are some major differences. Under EPSA IV, the government followed new procedures with sealed-bid rounds, non-negotiable conditions, selection criteria (based on contractor share, exploration commitments, bonuses, parallel investment and local content), pre-qualification procedures and minimum expenditure commitment. Unlike EPSA III, awards were granted for companies that made the highest bid on the share of gross production going to NOC. This bidding parameter is usually referred to as the production factor while the remaining share going to the contractor is referred to as ‘cost recovery’. This can be considered as novelty as the share going to the national oil company is usually pre-determined in the model contract or subject to negotiation. In effect, this production factor acts like a royalty since it is taken from gross output and is not accessible to the foreign investor. In our example, the bid yielded a production factor of 86.3% or a cost recovery bid of 13.7% (100%-86.3%). This means that the company has to recover its exploration, development and operational costs from its 13.7% share of production.
In case of a tie on the production factor, the company offering the highest bonus would receive the licensing award (Johnston, 2005). Thus, the companies had to compete on bonus payments as well. As can be seen from the tables above, the bonuses were quite high in some cases especially in the first round of bidding. That being said there is a large divergence in the amount of bonuses paid varying from zero to $25.6 million. Bonuses are the most harmful from the view of the contractor as these are paid regardless of whether a discovery is made. Furthermore, the contractor is not allowed to recover bonus payments from cost oil.
The new agreements also give the option for NOC to participate in the venture if a commercial discovery is made. In this case, NOC is said to be carried through the exploration phase. In other words, it has the option to take a working interest in the venture without reimbursing the 8 exploration costs incurred by the contractor but it would pay its share of development costs. In the example of Verenex, the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) has the option to be carried through exploration and obtain a 50% working interest of the venture. In return, NOC agrees to pay 50% of capital expenditure. The NOC is also carried further through development phase where it would pay 86.3% of the venture’s operating expenditures. Until the contractor recovers his costs, the entire 13.7% share of production goes to the contractor. Once the contractor recovers his costs, the difference (i.e. profit oil) is shared between the contractor and NOC based on two sliding scales: R factor calculated as the ratio of accumulated receipts by the contractor to the accumulated capital expenditure (R factor) and the current year total project production rate (P factor). The share of profit oil accruing to the contractor in each quarter is equal to: R×P×Profit Oil. As can be seen from this example, the contractor take under EPSA IV is relatively low. Furthermore, there are also limits on how much the oil company can benefit from the upside potential of its investment. In fact, the overall government take for EPSA IV blocks averaged around 88% which is considered as one of the highest in the world (Johnston, 2005).
The Libyan case illustrates that despite its reliance on foreign oil companies, Libya has proved over and over again its ability to impose tough fiscal terms by timing its renegotiations with favourable changes in oil market conditions, The pressures from long sanctions and the desire to re-establish political and economic links with the West do not seem to have changed Libya’s approach towards dealing with foreign oil companies.
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